Colombias Petro Is Off to an AMLO-Like Start. Can He Maintain It?

However, Arnson sees an even greater impediment to good U.S. relations in another of Petro’s early moves: the administration’s embrace of normalization with Venezuela. Images of the Colombian ambassador to Caracas joyfully embracing Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro are sure to raise eyebrows, for example.

“It shows a desire to immediately have a friendly relationship, as if there suddenly weren’t any problems with this government that has been accused by the U.N. Human Rights Council of crimes against humanity,” she said.

And unlike the approach to drug policy, the change of tone with regard to Venezuela promises few social or economic benefits.

“The minister of commerce said they will recuperate a big chunk of trade with Venezuela, in the billions of dollars. That’s not going to happen — Venezuela doesn’t have that money,” said former Vice President Santos. “This is only going to help Maduro and criminal organizations along the border.”

Santos said he fears Petro could severely worsen Colombia’s fragile security situation with such moves, particularly if the administration also takes a hands-off approach to militants, adding that increased violence in the urban areas could “be Petro’s biggest downfall.”

But Santos said the United States can’t afford to wash its hands of Colombia, despite what he called Petro’s “anti-American DNA.” Though the United States had little direct role in Petro’s election, failure to prioritize pragmatic cooperation over moral or ideological conflicts would further entrench a cycle of neighborly neglect with long-term consequences for the entire hemisphere.

“The United States has shown it doesn’t give a s--- about Latin America. They should understand that the ideological, political and economic conflicts of the future have a lot to do with the region, and that they neglect it,” he said, though he dismissed notions that U.S. neglect contributed to Petro’s election as ignorant of the domestic political dynamics that played greater roles.

The real risk, according to Santos, is when the United States sacrifices hard-earned influence and soft power to rivals such as China. When Washington fails to engage in a pragmatic relationship with Colombia and places too much pressure on Bogotá over issues like human rights, “China comes in and says, ‘I don’t give a s--- about your human rights.’”

As Petro rolls out his policy agenda, it’s too early to say how a decline in popular support — or conversely, a continuation of his popularity — might shift the particulars of his approaches and their palatability to the United States. But the U.S.-Colombia relationship will remain key to handling drugs, violence and migration throughout the Western Hemisphere, and Washington  would do well to adhere to a long-term vision in its relations with Bogotá.

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